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ARTICLES 
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 
AND THE BUSINESS BENEFIT: 
THE NEED FOR CLARITY 
SHELBY D. GREEN* 
"'MYSTERY' was made possible by a grant from Mobil 
Corporation. III 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, Mobil's contributions to charitable causes reached 
almost $10 million.1! Even more generous, Exxon gave over $2.5 
million to public television, $19 million to colleges and universi-
ties, and $3.2 million to the arts, museums and historical as-
sociations, as well as millions to other donees.3 All told, Exxon 
gave more than $39.8 million· and with IBM, Atlantic Richfield 
and similar companies chipping in, charitable causes received 
nearly $4.5 billion from U.S. corporations.1I While not insignifi-
• Assistant Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova University; B.S. 
Towson State College; J.D. Georgetown University. The author wishes to express special 
thanks to William Ruggiero for his assistance in the production of this article. 
1. Transcript of underwriting acknowledgement for "MYSTERY," a television se-
ries featured on public television. 
2. MOBIL FOUNDATION, INC., 1987 STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS 24 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter "MOBIL STATEMENT"]. 
3. EXXON CORPORATION. DIMENSIONS 1987. A REPORT ON EXXON'S 1987 CONTRIBU-
TIONS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE EXXON EDUCATION FOUNDATION REPORT 3 (1988) 
[hereinafter "EXXON REPORT"]. 
4. [d. at 2. 
5. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF FUND-RAISING COUNSEL TRUST FOR PHILANTHROPY GIV-
ING USA, THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1987. Total charitable 
contributions from all sources for 1987 was $93.68 billion. [d. Of the $76.8 billion given 
239 
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cant, this sum represented less than five percent of all charitable 
giving for that year, as individuals accounted for $76.8 billion.s 
What is the motivation for such philanthropy? Admittedly, 
many individuals and businesses give simply to realize the tax 
benefits.7 Even without the tax deduction, many individuals who 
give would find it hard to refuse the Girl Scouts or the church 
offering plate. Moral sentiments are decisive. But, beyond tax 
incentives, why do these non-human entities - business corpo-
rations - give to charity and how can such philanthropy be rec-
onciled with the most basic aspect of a business corporation, i.e., 
the object of making money for its investors? 
It is supposed that corporations give to charitable causes 
out of self-interest - indeed, it is argued that this is all that the 
law permits8 - as a measured business response to political 
pressures and public hostility.s But can corporations give out of 
altruism - simply on the basis that giving is the social responsi-
bility of all citizens, including corporate citizens? Case law and 
some commentary appear to answer no. Nevertheless, the actual 
giving practices of corporations seem, difficult to explain 
otherwise. 
In early corporate history, it was of great importance to ex-
amine the motivation for expenditures. The common law was 
most exacting in its scrutiny of the exercise of corporate powers 
and generally prohibited activities by corporations not directly 
related to the corporate business.1o The relationship between 
charitable contributions and the achievement of business re-
. turns, initially, eluded the courts and scholars. Any expenditure 
of corporate assets on causes which appeared altruistic in nature 
to charity by individuals, more than half, $43.6 billion, went to religious organizations. 
Id. at 9. 
6.Id. 
7. Under the Internal Revenue Code, individual taxpayers can reduce taxable in-
come by amounts contributed to charity up to fifty percent of adjusted gross income 
(with certain other limitations). Corporate taxpayers can take a deduction for charitable 
contributions of up to ten percent of taxable income. 1.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(1990). 
8. See Prunty, Love And The Business Corporation, 46 VA. L. REV. 467, 475-76 
(1960); see also Garrett, Corporate Donations, 22 Bus. LAW. 297 (1967). 
9. Manne, The Limits And Rationale Of Corporate Altrusim:' An Individualistic 
Model, 59 VA. L. REV. 708 (1973); see also Note, Corporate Altruism: A Rational Ap-
proach, 59 GEO. L.J. 117 (1970). 
IO.Id. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol20/iss2/1
1990] CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY 241 
was condemned as ultra vires or beyond the corporation's legiti-
mate powers.n However, changes in prevailing industrial condi-
tions brought along changes in business methods. At the turn of 
the century, some courts grew receptive to the notion that a do-
nation to an otherwise charitable cause might yield economic 
benefits to the corporation.12 In one of the early cases recogniz-
ing this theory, Steinway v. Steinway & Sons/3 the court 
explained: 
It is a question, therefore, in each case of the logi-
cal relation of the act to the corporation purpose 
expressed in the charter. If that act is one which 
is lawful in itself and not otherwise prohibited, is 
done for the purpose of serving corporate ends 
and is reasonably tributary to the promotion of 
those ends, in a substantial and not in a remote 
and fanciful sense, it may fairly be considered 
within charter powers. The field of corporate ac-
tion in respect to the exercise of incidental powers 
is thus, I think, an expanding one. As industrial 
conditions change, business methods must change 
with them, and acts become permissible which at 
an earlier period would not have been considered 
to be within corporate power.14 
In light of current interpretations of a corporation's power 
to give to charity and the enactment of statutes in virtually 
every state and the District of Columbia expressly empowering 
corporations to make charitable contributions,lII it is still fair to 
ask to what extent the law limits the power of corporate manag-
ers or whether charitable giving is a matter of business judg-
ment, a prerogative of the corporation's board of directors. 
Many charitable gifts, such as contributions to inner city pro-
grams to aid the homeless or contributions to humanistic studies 
at liberal arts colleges, are open to attack as merely altruistic in' 
their aim. Despite the appearance of altruism though, can it be 
11. Community Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Fields, 128 F.2d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 
194~). 
12. For example, establishment of a hospital for employees of the corporation might 
generate greater productivity from a healthy and contented workforce. 
13. 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. 1896). 
14. Id. at 47, 40 N.Y.S. at 720. See also text accompanying notes 38-69, infra. 
15. See Note, Corporate Altruism: A Rational Approach, 59 GEO. L. R. 117, 136 n. 
113 (1970). . 
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proven that corporate managers are not in reality chilled by the 
necessity to demonstrate some discern able return to the 
corporation? 
Recently, the American Law Institute ("ALI"), as part of its 
Corporate Governance Project,18 proposed a rule to define the 
limits of a business corporation's power to make charitable con-
tributions. Proposed Section 2.01, The Objective and Conduct of 
the Business Corporation, would provide: 
A business corporation should have as its objec-
tive the conduct of business activities with a view 
to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder 
gain, except that, whether or not corporate profit 
and shareholder gain are thereby enhanced, the 
corporation, in the conduct of its business 
... ... ... 
... ... ... 
(c) may devote a reasonable amount of resources 
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and 
philanthropic purposes.17 
As with the other areas addressed in the Corporate Govern-
ance Project, the ALI perceived a need to restate or clarify often 
conflicting or illogical legal principles in light of historical and 
judicial developments. There is a need for such a restatement on 
the power of a business corporation to make charitable 
contributions. 
This need for clarity or harmony is the subje,ct of this essay. 
Part II summarizes a philosophical debate between two scholars 
on the mission of the corporation. Part III briefly traces the his-
torical development of the relevant principles and Part IV ex-
16. The mission of the Corporate Governance Project is contained within the subti-
tle of the work, that is, to provide "Analysis and Recommendations" on corporate prac-
tice. The drafters explain that all statements concerned with law should be regarded as 
recommendations of the Institute, with the context and the explanations in the comment 
making clear how far a recommendation is believed to be consistent with prevailing law 
and how far legal change is contemplated and if the latter, whether by decision or by 
legislation. Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations vii-ix 
(Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No.2 1984). 
17. [d. at 25. 
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amines the actual philanthropic practices of several large pub-
licly held corporations. Finally, Part V considers the continuing 
significance of the common law rule in light of these practices 
and urges support for the ALI proposal. 
II. CHARITY AND THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 
THE DEBATE 
Whether or not corporate managers may direct corporate 
profits away from shareholders to public charities raises at once 
the issue of the role of the corporation and its managers in soci-
ety. In the early 1930's, two leading corporate law scholars, 
Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, debated the question. IS In 
Berle's view: 
All powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group 
within the corporation, whether derived from 
statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at 
all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of 
all the shareholders as their interest appears. Ie 
Thus, according to Berle, corporate managers were "trustees" 
for the benefit of the shareholders and their sole responsibility 
was to the shareholders, and not to society generally.20 Berle's 
thesis was far from idle theory, as significant developments in 
the law of corporations were then unfolding. Most importantly, 
the enactment of liberal corporate statutes which multiplied the 
powers of corporate managers and the growth in size of corpora-
tions meant that, increasingly, shareholders relinquished control 
over the use of their property to corporate managers.21 Few 
doubted the need to establish controls which would more effec-
tively prevent corporate managers from diverting corporate prof-
its from stockholders into their own pockets.22 
In 1932, Dodd responded to Berle. While he agreed with the 
18. For a critical analysis of the debate, see Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on 
the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964). 
19. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1056-59 
(1931). 
20. Id. at 1073-74; see also BERLE & MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
21. BERLE & MEANS supra note 15, at 4-5. 
22. BERLE & MEANS supra note 16, at 247-49. 
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need to protect shareholders. from self-seeking managers, he did 
not agree that adoption of hard rules limiting permissible ob-
jects of the business corporations was the answer.23 Rather, 
Dodd noted a growing feeling that business had responsibilities 
to the community, and that corporate managers ·who control 
business should voluntarily, without legal compulsion, perform 
in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities.24 
He stated: 
The view that those who manage our business 
corporations should concern themselves with the 
interests of employees, consumers, and the gen-
eral public, as well as of the stockholders, is thus 
advanced today by persons whose position in the 
business world is such as to give them great power 
of influencing both business opinion and public 
opinion generally.26 
In fact, Professor Dodd points out: 
[T]here are indications that even today corpora-
tion managers not infrequently use corporate 
funds in ways which suggest a social responsibil-
ity rather than an exclusively profit-making view-
point. Take, for example, the matter of gifts by 
business corporations to local charities . . . The 
view that directors may within limits properly use 
corporate funds to support charities which are im-
portant to the welfare of the community in which 
the corporation does business probably comes 
much nearer to representing the attitude of pub-
lic opinion and the present corporate practice 
than does the traditional language of courts and 
lawyers.2e . 
Many corporations, in the absence of explicit statutory au-
thority and in spite of the traditional language of the courts, reg-
ularly made contributions to charitable causes. Twenty years 
later, following the enactment of statutory provisions au~horiz-
23. Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 
1147-48 (1932). . 
24. Id. at 1153-54. 
25. I d. at 1156. 
26. Id. at 1159. 
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ing corporations to make charitable contributions and significant 
court decisions on the issue, Berle concluded that "[t]he argu-
ment has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in 
favor of Professor Dodd's contention."27 
III. TO GIVE OR NOT TO GIVE? 
COMMON LAW 
THE ANSWER AT 
The traditional language of the courts on the mission of the 
business corporation was that this entity existed for the benefit 
of its shareholders.28 Under this conception, charity had no place 
within the business corporation.29 But the law did not always 
take so narrow a view of the corporation's powers. On the con-
trary, at its genesis, the corporation promised service to society. 
By the eighteenth century, it was accepted doctrine that the 
right to conduct business in the corporate form was a matter of 
royal prerogative.30 According to Hurst, the reasons for this pol-
icy had more to do with politics than economics. 
The impelling objective was to help focus and se-
cure political power at the head of the state. Val-
ues of governmental or business efficiency might 
move the grantees of charters. But through the 
early seventeenth century these were not the 
prime concerns of the Crown, which took the lead 
in asserting the national government's exclusive 
creative authority .... 31 
Thus, it suited the crown to issue charters to companies 
which promised public economic benefits. In fact, from the six-
27. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). Other scholars, 
however, have not conceded to Dodd's theory, as the list of commentary on the social 
responsibility of corporations is legion. See e.g., Sommer, The Struggle for Corporate 
Responsibility, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1987); Murphy, Ethical Concerns Among Corpo-
rate Executives, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. 631 (1987); Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: 
What it Might Mean, If It Were Really To Matter, 71 IOWA L. REv. 557 (1986); Engel, 
An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Epstein, 
Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility -
Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1287 (1979). 
28. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). 
29. Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co., 23 Del. Ch. 654 (1883). 
30. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 3 (1970). 
31. Id. at 3. 
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teenth century, royal chartering of companies to develop foreign 
trade and colonies was a prominent feature of national policy. 82 
The dual object of the business corporation continued in the 
United States. The earliest business corporations established at 
the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
centuries were founded for public· service objectives such as 
building turnpikes and canals, supplying water, fire fighting and 
providing insurance.88 However, out of fear of great aggregations 
of wealth and manpower, the corporate privilege was granted 
sparingly and strict limits were placed on size, scope of activity, 
and amount of real property that could be held.8• 
It was not until the end of the nineteenth century, under 
the momentum of the industrial revolution, that states enacted 
general corporation codes under which entrepreneurs could or-
ganize themselves for most business purposes, without the old 
limitations on size and ownership of property.811 Eventually, with 
the proliferation of corporations in all nature of business activity 
and the liberalization of corporation codes, private profit became 
generally accepted as the controlling objective in all businesses 
other than those classed broadly as public utilities.88 
Perhaps the most celebrated case to articulate this view is 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company.87 By 1919, the Ford Motor 
32. [d. According to Hurst, the royal charters legitimized the public functions per-
formed by these trading companies in organizing terms of trade, setting up local govern-
ments, controlling customs, and in effect, making foreign policy in their areas of opera-
tion. [d. at 4; see generally Seavoy, The Public Seruice Origins of the American 
Business Corporation, 52 Bus. HIST. REV. 30, 45-47 (1978) and Williston, History of the 
Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 109-110 (1888). Accord-
ing to Williston, among the more successful trading companies were the East India Com-
pany, the Royal African Company, and the Hudson's Bay Company. [d. 
33. CHAVES, INTRODUCTION TO DAVIS, CORPORATIONS (paper ed. 1961); DAVIS, ESSAYS 
IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 7 (1917). 
34. Seavoy, supra note 27, at 49; see also CARY & EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON CORPORATIONS 38 (5th ed. 1980). 
35. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 13 (1970), In the late eighteenth century, 
a number of states began following the practice in England and enacted legislation pro-
viding for self-incorporation, thereby avoiding the need for a special legislative act for a 
corporate charter, although the early statutes limited their application to religious, chari-
table or municipal institutions. See also CHAVES, supra note 33, at 2; DAVIS, supra note 
33, at 25. 
36. Dodd, supra note 23, at 1151-53. 
37. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). The company's purpose was to purchase, 
manufacture and place on the market for sale, automobiles, motors and devices and ap-
8
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Company had become tremendously wealthy. In fact, after only 
13 years in business, it had nearly $112 million in surplus. Henry 
Ford, the founder of the company, desired to spread the com-
pany's wealth over the country generally. He declared: "[M]y 
ambition . . .is . . . to spread the benefits of this industrial sys-
tem to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes. . . . "88 The board of directors shared Mr. 
Ford's vision and voted to increase employee wages and to re-
duce the price of the car, the company's chief product, in order 
to make it more affordable.89 The board also decided to suspend 
the payment of special dividends, which in four years had to-
taled more than $41 million, and to pay only the regular divi-
dends of $1.2 million per year.'o Unfortunately for Mr. Ford, 
shareholders, who together owned one-tenth of all the com-
pany's stock, protested these plans and filed suit.n At trial, 
counsel for the corporation argued that: . 
Although a manufacturing corporation cannot en-
gage in humanitarian works as its principal busi-
ness, the fact that it is organized for profit does 
not prevent the existence of implied powers to 
carryon with humanitarian motives such charita-
ble works as are incidental to the main business 
of the corporation.42 
In the court's view, there was a decided difference between 
"an incidental humanitarian expenditure of corporate funds for 
the benefit of the employees, like the building of a hospital for 
their use and the employment of agencies for the betterment of 
their condition and a general purpose and plan to benefit man-
kind at the expense of others. "'8 
The court explained that 
[a] business corporation is organized and carried 
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. 
pliances incident to the construction and operation of automobiles. Jd. at 460,170 N.W. 
at 669 . 
. 38. Id. at 462, 170 N.W. at 671. 
39. Id. at 461-63, 170 N.W. at 670-73. 
40.Id. 
41. Id. at 461, 170 N.W. at 670-71. 
42. Id. at 475, 170 N.W. at 684. 
43.Id. 
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The powers of the directors are to be employed 
for that end. The discretion of directors is to be 
exercised in the choice of means to attain that 
end, and does not extend to a change in the end 
itself .... 44 
The Ford decision would most certainly foreclose any 
thought of gifts to national symphonies, food banks, or humanis-
tic studies at educational institutions outside the community of 
the corporation's operations, since they would not be calculated 
to improve the workforce.411 In fact, the courts of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, insisted upon this sort of 
connection between the expenditure and the corporation.46 
These courts upheld contributions to local educational institu-
tions for the purpose of fitting persons to be its employees;47 do-
nations to community chests devoted to social, educational and 
recreational purposes in the community to satisfy employees;48 
donations to Y.M.C.A.s located along railroad lines to accommo-
date the railroads' employees;49 donations to build churches to 
provide for the employees' spiritual needs;IIO and donations for 
44. [d. The powers of the directors included those expressly granted in the corpora-
tion's charter, as well as those that are implied. Implied powers are those incidental to 
and connected with the carrying into effect or the accomplishing of the general purposes 
of the corporation, as expressed in the object clauses of the corporation's charter. Ac-
cording to Cary & Eisenberg, 
This approach [was] strongly justified, for the demands of the 
business world and the public on a corporation are not 
static. . . The social policy that sought to limit corporate 
power by restricting their size and activity fell victim to the 
changes initiated by the industrial revolution. 
CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 34, at 40-41. See also LA'M'IN, CORPORATIONS 205-06 
(1971). 
45. Instead of proclaiming altruistic objectives, had Mr. Ford simply offered the 
prospect of increased sales of cars in response to a retail price reduction and increased 
productivity from employees as a result of higher wages as the reasons for his plan, the 
court might well have sustained it. 
46. The limits of the business corporation's power to give to charitable causes under 
this theory were explored exhaustively in Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contrib-
ute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REV. 401 (1949). 
47. Cousens, supra note 46 at 404 (citing Armstrong Cork Co. v. H.A. Meldrum, 285 
F. 58 (W.n.N.Y. 1922)). 
48. [d. at 406-07 (citing American Rolling Mill Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 
1930)). 
49. [d. at 408 (citing Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Comm'r, 22 B.T.A. 949 (1931); 
Gulf Mobile RR v. Comm'r, 22 B.T.A. 233 (1931)). 
50. [d. at 409-10 (citing Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N.Y.S. 718 
(Sup. Ct. 1896)). 
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hospital construction in the community, III Similarly, where cor-
porations made contributions to projects designed to increase 
the number of prospective customers,1I2 and donations "in order 
to obtain goodwill and to maintain prestige where such results 
were sufficiently probable as to constitute a prospect of direct 
benefit,"IIS they were held to be within the corporation's implied 
or incidental powers. 
Early cases upholding gifts on the basis of the corporation's 
implied powers illustrate that the choices made by corporate 
managers were conservative and bore a demonstrable relation-
ship to the corporation. In other words, they were calculated to 
stabilize and cultivate the workforce as well as customers, thus 
providing direct benefits to the employees and improving public 
relations. In later cases, this reasoning was extended to uphold 
gifts to those objects, such as liberal arts studies and general 
charitable foundations, whose relationship to the corporation 
and the prospect of future benefits to the corporation was at 
best uncertain. Three modern cases addressed the legality of 
such giving. 
In A.P. Smith v. Barlow,&4 the corporation was engaged in 
the manufacture and sale of valves, fire hydrants and special 
equipment, mainly for the water and gas industries. Over the 
years, the company had contributed regularly to the local com-
munity chest and occasionally to colleges situated in the same 
county as the company.1I11 
In 1951, the board of directors adopted a resolution to con-
tribute $1,500 to Princeton University. liS The corporation's char-
ter did not expressly authorize the contribution.1I7 Shareholders 
51. Id. at 414 (citing Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1929); 
J.P. Coats, Inc. v. Comm'r, 28 B.T.A. 1128 (1933)). 
52. Id. at 420 (citing Davis v. Old Colony R.R., 131 Mass. 258 (1881) (world's peace 
jubilee and international music festival); Tomkinson v. South Eastern Ry., 35 Ch.D. 675 
(1887) (world's fair)). 
53. Id. at 420-22. Such donations took the form of gifts to literary and scientific 
organizations, state fairs and public baseball fields. 
54. 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953). 
55.Id. 
56.Id. 
57. A statute provided that directors could cause their corporation 
to contribute for charitable and educational purposes and the 
like . . . such reasonable sum or sums as they may determine 
11
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of the corporation questioned the gift on the ground that the 
directors were without the necessary power to make the gift, and 
the board of directors sought a declaratory judgment on the 
question.1I8 
The court upheld the gift on both statutory and common 
law principles.1I9 First, charitable contributions were a lawful ex-
ercise of the corporation's implied and incidental powers as de-
fined by the prevailing economic and social conditions.60 The 
court stated: ' 
[J]ust as the conditions prevailing when corpora-
tions were originally created required that they 
serve public as well as private interests, modern 
conditions require that corporations acknowledge 
and discharge social as well as private responsibil-
ities as members of the communities within which 
they operate.81 
The significant "modern conditions" which were different from 
those prevailing at the time the common law rule evolved were 
the transfer of most of the nation's wealth to corporate hands 
and the imposition of heavy burdens by individual taxation. As 
individuals were unable to keep pace with increased philan-
thropic needs, charities "with justification, turned to corpora-
tions to assume the modern obligations of good citizenship in 
the same manner as humans do. "62 As state legislatures and 
Congress encouraged corporate contributions,63 corporations 
... provided ... that such contributions might not be made 
in situations where the proposed donee owned more than 10% 
of the voting stock of the donor and provided further that 
such gifts be limited to 5% of capital and surplus unless ... 
authorized by the stockholders. 
N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:3-13.1 (1950). 
58. A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. at 145, 98 A.2d at 581. 
59.Id. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. at 150, 98 A.2d at 586. 
62.Id. 
63. The preamble to the 1950 version of the New Jersey statute declared that: 
[lIt shall be the public policy of our state and in furtherance 
of the public interest and welfare that encouragement be given 
to the creation and maintenance of institutions engaged in 
community fund, hospital, charitable, philanthropic, educa-
tional, scientific or benevolent activities or patriotic or civic 
activities conducive to the betterment of social and economic 
conditions. 
12
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came "to recognize that their salvation rests upon a sound eco-
nomic and social environment which in turn rests in no insignifi-
cant part upon free and vigorous nongovernmental institutions 
of learning."e. 
The court went further: 
But even if we confine ourselves to the terms of 
the common law rule in its application to current 
conditions, such expenditures may likewise read-
ily be justified as being for the benefit of the cor-
poration; indeed, if need be the matter may be 
viewed strictly in terms of actual survival of the 
corporation in a free enterprise system.85 
The shareholders' claims were dismissed and in a chastising 
tone, the court . stated: 
Clearly then, the [shareholders] whose private in-
terests rest entirely upon the well-being of the 
. . . corporation, ought not be permitted to close 
their eyes to present-day realities and thwart the 
long-visioned corporate action in recognizing and 
voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a 
constituent of our modern social structure.88 
The benefit identified in this case, the preservation of free enter-
prise, obviously was neither an immediate nor direct one. In-
deed, the relationship between the act and its goal (a $1;500 gift 
to Princeton and the strengthening of "free enterprise"), while 
perhaps perceptible, is still remote, almost fanciful. 
In Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Trustees, Inc.r the corporation 
adopted a resolution authorizing a $5,000 contribution of corpo-
rate funds to the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, a non-
profit entity organized by the corporation, and dedicated to 
charitable, scientific, religious and educational purposes.S8 
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:3·13.1 (1950). 
In 1968, the New Jersey statute was amended to delete the previous 5 percent of 
surplus limit on contributions and to provide that a corporation has such power to make 
charitable contributions "irrespective of corporate benefit." N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A:3·4 
(1968). 
64. A.P. Smith, 13 N.J. at 150, 98 A.2d at 586. 
65. [d. 
66. [d. at 154, 98 A.2d at 590. 
67. 8 Utah 2d 101, 329 P.2d 398 (1958). 
68. [d. 
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Here, as in A.P. Smith, the court found the concept of im-
plied powers to be fluid, one defined by the prevailing social and 
economic conditions. Thus, in the present era, the effect of in-
creasing tax burdens on individuals who had long supported pri-
vate institutions to which corporations looked for their supply of 
business executives, was significant. Such conditions initiated 
new calls upon business corporations for financial support of 
these institutions, and led to a "new concept of corporate re-
sponsibility."69 This new conception had achieved the status of 
business policy,70 which seemed to be nurtured by legislative, 
corporate and judicial thinking.71 It followed that under this new 
concept of corporate responsibility, corporations necessarily had 
the implied power to make contributions to charity if they ap-
peared reasonably designed to assure a present or foreseeable fu-
ture benefit to the corporation.72 
The "benefit" to the corporation here was goodwill engen-
dered by the contributions.73 It was 
not too much unlike the sponsoring of a baseball 
team, subsidizing promising scholars with a view 
toward possibly employing them later on, giving 
to the local community chest, paying the salary of 
public relations expert, sponsoring a concert or 
television program, or conducting a newspaper or 
radio advertising program. Such actions seldom 
produce any immediate and direct corporate ben-
efits, but all involve use of corporate funds that 
otherwise could have gone to shareholders had 
such funds remained unspent.74 
While the type of goodwill identified presented a closer con-
nection to the business than the distant goal of preserving free 
enterprise identified in A.P. Smith, the Union Pac. R.R. Co. 
court was willing to embrace a much broader conception of im-
plied powers: 
69. Id. at 102-3, 329 P.2d at 400-1. 
70. The court credited the testimony of several business executives that it was 
sound business policy to contribute to charitable causes. Id. at 102, 329 P.2d at 401. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 105, 329 P.2d at 402. 
73.Id. 
74.Id. 
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[T]o illustrate a type of corporate power that we 
would consider implied, that within the first dec-
ade of its existence, on the occasion of the San 
Francisco earthquake, . . . the Union Pacific, 
without charge, shipped in 1,600 carloads of food 
and material and gave $200,000 cash to, and evac-
uated a quarter of a million persons from the 
stricken area gratis.7D 
253 
The court seemed to say that to the extent that the corpora-
tion, by these magnanimous acts, will improve the corporation's 
reputation and promote favorable public attitudes toward it, the 
corporation achieves a benefit that is legally sufficient. 
In Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson,76 the corporation 
resolved to make a contribution of $528,000 to a charitable foun-
dation, which was authorized to operate exclusively in the fields 
of "religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational pur-
poses, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."77 
The corporation previously had made smaller cash gifts to the 
foundation and had donated a large tract of land valued at 
nearly $500,000 for the purpose of establishing a camp for 
under-privileged boys.78 
The gift was upheld on the basis of the Delaware statute 
which specifically empowered corporations to make charitable 
contributions.79 In contrast to the New Jersey statute at issue in 
A.P. Smith, the Delaware statute contained no limitations on 
the amount of any gift that might lawfully be made or on the 
permissible donees.8o The court therefore had only common law 
75. Id. at 103, 329 P.2d at 400 (footnote omitted). 
76. 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
77. Id. at 404. 
78. Id. It was interesting, yet apparently not significant to the court, that Hender-
son, who held voting control of the corporation, also controlled the affairs of the charita-
ble foundation and maintained an underground home at the camp. The plaintiff might 
well have argued the impropriety of the gift as a "pet project" of the controlling share-
holder. There was no doubt, however, that the foundation was recognized as a legitimate 
charitable trust by the Internal Revenue Service. Id. 
79. Id. at 404. The Delaware General Corporation Law provided that every corpora-
tion created thereunder "shall have the power to make donations for the public welfare 
or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national 
emergency in aid thereof .... " Id. (Citing DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 122(9) (1974)). 
80.Id. 
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principles as its guide and concluded that the test to be applied 
was one of reasonableness.s1 Accordingly, three facts were deci-
sive: the gift represented less than 2% of the corporation's total 
income; it fell within the amount allowed as a deduction by the 
Internal Revenue Code; and it actually produced a reduction in 
capital gains taxes.S2 The court concluded: 
It is accordingly obvious, in my opinion, that the 
relatively small loss of immediate income other-
wise payable to plaintiff and the corporate de-
fendant's other stockholders, had it not been for 
the gift in question, is far out-weighed by the 
overall benefits flowing from the placing of such 
gift in channels where it serves to benefit those in 
need of philanthropic or educational support, 
thus providing justification for large private hold-
ings, thereby benefiting plaintiff in the long run.SS 
Only in the most abstract sense, can the "long-run benefit" iden-
tified by this court be translated into the economic terms that 
the common law rule contemplated.s, Surely, the theory of these 
holdings is so broad that it would not be frivolous to say that 
under it, any gift can be justified.slI The range and amount of 
corporate charitable contributions today suggest that the com-
81. [d. at 405. 
82. [d. 
83. [d. 
84. One economist recognized the theoretical difficulty of such a task: 
It may be argued that all this amounts to long-run profit max-
imization and thus that management in the modern corpora-
tion does no more than business management has always tried 
to do, allowing for changed circumstances. But the uncertainty 
attached to some benefits (say those of being a high-wage em-
ployer), the difficulty of translating into cash terms others 
(such as maintaining good community relations), the remote-
ness in time of still others (such as supporting liberal arts edu-
cation) indicate that profit maximization must be given a very 
. elastic interpretation indeed to cover all these activities .... 
See Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corpora-
tion, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311, 313-14 (1957). 
85. Corporate managers may nonetheless be constrained by the common law doc-
trine of waste, that is, the diversion of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary pur-
poses, such as where the corporation does not receive adequate consideration for its as-
sets. See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979)(executive stock option 
plan); Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431, 278 N.E.2d 642 (1972). 
Further, the fiduciary obligations of corporate officers and directors would preclude ap-
plication of corporate assets to their personal use or benefit. See generally, CARY & EI-
SENBERG, supra note 34, at 563-64. 
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mon law rule imposes little constraint upon corporations in the 
selection of charitable objects. Our examination of the actual 
giving practices as reported by a variety of sources, including 
corporations, support this view. While the following summaries 
are by no means offered as an empirical analysis of the philan-
thropic practices of all business corporations, they are nonethe-
less instructive as to the need for concrete reform. 
IV. THE OBJECTS OF THE CORPORATIONS' 
PHILANTHROPY 
As the quoted sponsorship acknowledgment suggests, Mobil 
Oil Corporation has been a long-standing supporter of public 
television. In its own words, Mobil explains that it 
is committed to the support of cultural and com-
munity programs for many reasons, one of which 
is the sincere belief that corporations must be so-
cially responsible in every aspect of their busi-
ness. A corporation exists within a society and 
Mobil believes that as a corporation enriches a so-
ciety - preserving and enhancing society's best 
values - it helps create a more beneficial envi-
ronment for all.88 
In 1987, Mobil Foundation made charitable contributions to 
culture and the arts totalling $1.4 million.87 Of the $2.10 million 
given to civic causes,88 several are noteworthy in that it is diffi-
cult to view them as anything but the product of pure altrusim. 
Consider a $50,000 grant to the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration 
Corporation; a $1,500 grant to the Fifth City Human Develop-
ment, Inc.; a $2,500 gift to the Orphan Asylum Society of the 
City of Brooklyn; and a $2,000 gift to St. Francis Friends of the 
Poor, Inc.89 . 
The charitable giving of Exxon Corporation was similar to 
Mobil's, although Exxon's total contributions of more than $39.7 
86. MOBIL CORPORATION, A GUIDE TO MOBIL'S SUPPORT OF ARTS AND CULTURE 1 
(1986). 
87. See MOBIL STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 10. 
88. [d. at 14. 
89. [d. at 10-14. In addition, Mobil gave $1.4 million to community causes; $3.99 
million to education; and $1.06 million to health agencies and hospitals. [d. at 17, 22-24. 
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million far " exceeded Mobil's.90 Exxon's giving was divided into 5 
program areas: environment, public information and policy re-
search; education; health, welfare and community services; arts, 
museums, and historical associations; and public broadcasting 
programming.91 Most of these grants would meet the common 
law test because the gifts were made to entities within the com-
munities in which the corporation operates, to institutions of 
higher learning that offer research degree programs related to 
the corporation's operations, to activities and events likely to re-
sult in publicity for the corporation, or to conservative public 
policy research organizations designed to influence public opin-
ion and laws.92 
Many of the earmarked grants, however, would be highly 
questionable under the common law rule. Consider a $9,000 
grant to the American Antiquarian Society for a conference on 
"Teaching the History of the Book;"93 a $37,500 gift to Johns 
Hopkins University "[iJn support of a doctoral program in Polit-
ical and Moral Thought;"94 and a $49,000 gift to the University 
of Minnesota, "[flor an effort to identify the knowledge and 
competencies that beginning secondary school teachers should 
have."911 
Under its Environment, Public Information and Policy Re-
search Program, Exxon gave $5,000 to Partners for Livable 
Places, Washington, D.C. for forums entitled, "Cities in Transi-
tion" and "Hispanics in America"96 and $15,000 to Ms. Founda-
tion for Women, Inc., New York "[tJo assist a national economic 
development and technical assistance program for organizations 
serving low-income, rural and minority women."97 In the Health 
and Human Services Program, Exxon gave $25,000 to Johns 
Hopkins University Center for Alternatives to Animal Testing,98 
90. EXXON REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. 
91. [d. at 3. 
92. See generally id. Contributions included grants to such organizations as the 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Washington, D.C. ($130,000); Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C. ($145,000); and the Heritage Foundation, Washington, 
D.C. ($30,000). [d. at 6·7. 
93. [d. at 41. 
94. [d. at 42. 
95. [d. at 48. 
96. [d. at 5. 
97. [d. at 9. 
98. [d. at 14. 
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$12,000 to Harvard University, School of Public Health "toward 
research into uses of mass media to help prevent adolescent sub-
stance abuse,"99 and, under its Curriculum and Teaching Pro-
gram, a $30,000 to the Linguistic Society of America "[t]o allow 
innovative programming to be incorporated into the plans for its 
Linguistic Institutes. "100 
In 1987, Gannett Foundation, which is funded by contribu-
tions from Gannett Company, Inc./ol gave $1.24 million to the 
homeless;102 $415,000 to the mentally disabled;los and $1.13 mil-
lion to the poor. lO• Its contributions to charity totalled more 
than $29 million. 1011 While the human concern behind these gifts 
is clear, donations to the Gannett Foundation's Adult Literacy 
Program of $1.15 millionl06 and donations to journalism educa-
tion programs of $6.59 millionl07 reveal a measure of self-inter-
est, as Gannett's business depends on the literacy of both its au-
dience and employees. 
In 1987; AT&T Foundation made contributions of $14.9 
million to educational institutions and programs, which went to 
well-known colleges and universities for liberal arts as well as 
science and engineering programs.108 In addition, grants to vari-
ous health centers and hospitals, included causes with no partic- ' 
ular relationship to the corporation, such as $50,000 to American 
Red Cross Disaster Fund; $10,000 to Evangelical Health Sys-
99. [d. at 15. 
100. [d. at 42. 
101. Gannett Company, Inc. is a publicly held corporation engaged in various media 
related activities including newspaper publishing and radio and television broadcasting. 
102. GANNETI FOUNDATION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1987). 
103. [d. 
104. [d. 
105. [d. In general, Gannett Foundation donated $11.94 million in local grants 
(which included programs in community development, conservation, crime prevention, 
culture, disaster assistance, economy, education, health, recreation, and social services); 
$3.5 million to Community Priorities Program (such as the Addison County Community 
Action Group, Burlington, Vermont, Community Services Resource Corporation, Los An-
geles, California and the Children's Aid Society, New York, New York); $2.99 million in 
journalism grants; $3.84 in special grants (such as to the Library of Congress, Hope for a 
Drug-Free America, Washington, D.C. and the United Negro College Fund, New York, 
New York); $1.73 million to Adult Literacy; $3.61 to Operating Programs; and $1.53 to 
Scholarship and Matching Gifts. [d. 
106. [d. at 29. 
107. [d. at 42. 
108. AT&T, PUBLIC SERVICE ACTIVITY 1986/1987, A BIENNIAL REPORT 11 (1988). 
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terns, Illinois; and $12,500 to the Fund for Human Dignity, New 
York.109 
Under its "Social Action" category, AT&T gave $12,500 to 
the National Adoption Exchange; $5,000 to the Wilderness Soci-
ety; $20,000 to the Colorado Amateur Sports Corporation; and 
$30,000 to the National Puerto Rican Coalition, Virginia.1lO 
In 1987, ARCO Foundation made grants totalling $11.39 
million.1l1 Of this total $3.56 million or 31 percent went to col-
leges and universities in liberal arts and science and technical 
programs and $5.66 million or 50 percent went to community 
programsll2 such as $25,000 to the Alliance for Aging Research, 
Washington, D.C., for Public Education and Policy Studies on 
the Aging Process;118 $5,000 to the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, Washington, D.C.;ll. $5,000 to Projects, Hermosa 
Beach, California, for Emergency Shelter Program;11II $10,000 to 
Community Food Resources Council, Pasadena, California, for 
Surplus Food Distribution for Low-Income People;116 $3,000 to 
Human Resources Council, San Andreas, California, for Legal 
Assistance Services;117 $1,200 to the Peninsula Learning Re-
source, Kenai, Alaska, to Purchase Books and Materials for Stu-
dents and Tutors;1l8 and $14,500 to Brothers Redevelopment, 
Denver Colorado, for "Paint-a-Thon" Low Income Housing 
Rehabilitation.1l9 
In its 1987 publication, General Electric Foundation boasts 
of its contributions to assist in coping with the AIDS problem, 
to which it contributed $28,170;120 its involvement with the Na-
109. [d. at 43. 
110. [d. at 45-48. 
111. ARCO FOUNDATION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988). 
112. [d. 
113. [d. at 13. 
114. [d. at 14. 
115. [d. at 20. 
116. [d. at 22. 
117. [d. at 22. 
118. [d. at 36. 
119. [d. at 13. ARCO Foundation further contributed $1.24 million (11 percent of its 
total contributions) to Arts and Humanities, which included grants to the Museum of 
Modern Art, New York ($2,500); Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington ($2,500); Ford's 
Theatre, Washington ($10,000); Dance Theatre of Harlem, New York ($28,500); and 
Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts ($25,000). [d. at 4, 15, 25, 34. 
120. [d. at 21. 
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tional Center for Therapeutic Riding, Washington, D.C. 
(through a $10,000 contribution);12l its support of the National 
Council on Alcoholism with a $25,000 grant;122 its $25,000 contri-
bution to the African Medical and Research Foundation;123 its 
$30,380 donation to the Lowndes County (Alabama) public 
schools;124 and a $49,300 grant to Young Audiences/GE Founda-
tion Artists Award.12II In all, GE contributed $37 million to such 
social causes.il18 . 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
From an analysis of the judicial cases and actual charitable 
practices of some of the largest corporate contributors, two pro-
positions seem valid: 1) any gift can be couched in such terms as 
to promise the kinds of intangible, long-run benefits held by the 
courts as legally sufficient and 2) any charitable contribution to 
generally recognized social causes thus benefits the corporation. 
To achieve these benefits, the philanthropic object need not 
be related to the corporation. Instead, the corporation's only 
burden is to publish its efforts. In other words, it is simply the 
act of giving, when known, which generates favorable attitudes 
among employees, customers and the electorate .. The common 
law benefit requirement, as such, is without meaningful content 
as a limitation on the power of corporate managers. To answer 
the initial question posed by this essay, the only limitations ap-
pear to be those imposed upon directors by their general fiduci-
ary obligations to the corporation. Large publicly held corpora-
tions do not hesitate to declare their commitment to achieving 
social ends with corporate assets (even though their primary mo-
tivation may be some long-run economic benefit). Yet, for corpo-
rations with less economic and political standing than Exxon 
and Gannett, the benefit requirement may remain a deterrent to 
some managers who, fearing shareholder challenges, may follow 
a ~onservative path in making donations to charitable causes. lIl'1 
121. [d. at 22. 
122. [d. at 22. 
123. [d. at 26. 
124. [d. at 22. 
125. GENERAL ELECTRIC FOUNDATION. INC., THE GE FOUNDATIONS 1987 ANNUAL RE-
PORTS 23 (1988). 
126. [d. at 1. 
127. Charitable contributions have been a recurring issue at the annual sharehold-
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These involuntary choices may ignore social priorities, leaving 
many worthwhile causes wanting. 
On the surface there appears some disharmony between the 
actual practices of corporations and the dictates of the common 
law rule. It is time formally to free corporate managers from the 
common law's lingering grasp. 
ers' meetings. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, CORPORATE GIVING IN THE 
REAGAN YEARS (1986); BERTSCH, CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY (1982). 
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